



# Warwickshire **POLICE**

## Programme Closure Report

### Empower People – Policing Operating Model

Author:	Nick Clarke – Head of Change
Change Lead:	Ch Supt Mike Smith
SRO:	Alex Franklin Smith - DCC
Date:	January 2024
Version:	V1
GPMS marking:	Official – Sensitive

Contents

1. PURPOSE ..... 4

2. METHODOLOGY ..... 4

3. CONTEXT ..... 4

4. DESIGN PHASE ..... 6

5. PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT ..... 13

6. LOCAL POLICING POST IMPLEMENTATION REVIEW ..... 19

7. PROTECTIVE SERVICES POST IMPLEMENTATION REVIEW ..... 28

8. ENABLING SERVICES POST IMPLEMENTATION REVIEW ..... 34

9. SUMMARY OF ACTIONS..... 35

## Document Control

Version	Date	Reason for Issue	Revised By
0.1	01/05/22	First draft – issue to AFS, MS, SR	Nick Clarke
1	18/01/23	Feedback from Executive Board	Nick Clarke

## Document Approval

Change Lead	
Signature	Ch Supt M Smith
Print Name	
Date	

Senior Responsible Officer (SRO)	
Signature	DCC Alex Franklin Smith
Print Name	
Date	

## 1. Purpose

- 1.1. The purpose of this report is to provide closure for Empower People Phase 1 – Policing Operating Model (referred to as ‘the programme’ throughout this report). The objective of this report is that Change Board approves the formal closure of the programme, understands the lessons learned and that there is clear ownership for any further required activity.
- 1.2. This report is specific to the change delivered by the programme and is not a holistic review of Warwickshire Police’s (the force) operating model and organisational performance. Within this report there are a number of ongoing actions, risks and lessons learned aligned to the tranches of the programme’s delivery. Unless stated otherwise, these will be taken forward by Local Policing and Protective Services command.

## 2. Methodology


- 2.1. Extensive engagement with all senior police leads and Chief Officers has been undertaken for this review. Qualitative data has been sourced on all aspects of the new model, ranging from the change management through to outcomes, challenges, and lessons learned.
- 2.2. In parallel, quantitative data has been sourced to support the review where appropriate. However, it is important to note that this review is not a ‘deep dive’ on organisational performance. All areas of the model and associated KPIs are tracked in detail as part of business-as-usual governance and statutory performance reporting. Further, this report is specific to the scope of Empower People Phase 1 and does not focus on the wider organisation where there was no / minimal change.
- 2.3. The data collected through this review was the focus of a Chief Officer and senior leads all day event to triage the feedback and debate the current position. This has informed the conclusions of the report.
- 2.4. The report is structured around three key sections: design, programme management, and post implementation review. For each, the approach is to baseline the change against the original design principles and strategic intent, analyse the impact of the change and identify lessons learned and further action required.

## 3. Context

- 3.1. In October 2018, West Mercia Police issued a letter to Warwickshire Police indicating a termination of the Strategic Alliance agreement.
- 3.2. At the point of notice to terminate, over 90% of Warwickshire Police capabilities were operating within an integrated alliance shared service model, which left the force in a vulnerable position. Warwickshire Police took this as an opportunity to plan and reinvest in the force’s future through a sustainable new, organisation wide operating model that delivers long term value to the public in Warwickshire.

- 3.3.** All the changes required by the force to exit the alliance and stand up its own or new services, were designed and implemented under Evolve, supported and overseen by Chief Officers and the PCC to ensure good governance. The change within Evolve was complex and multi-year and while holistic design across all future services happened in parallel, it was delivered in managed stages between 2019 and 2022.
- 3.4.** Warwickshire Police successfully exited the alliance in April 2022. While there had been significant redesign of services during the Evolve programme (e.g. Evolve II), this new steady state was the first opportunity to review the operating model holistically with all services back under the force's control.
- 3.5.** In addition, there were other factors drove the need to holistically review the force's operating model, including:
- COVID-19 pandemic – impacting both the demand and response of the policing service and wider ramifications across society in terms of behaviours and expectations. It was also anticipated to have a long-term impact on public finances.
  - Police officer uplift – funded by precept and the national uplift programme, Warwickshire moved from 835 officers in March 2018 to 1060 in March 2021 (FTE equivalent).
  - Introduction of PEQF – the model for training officers changed significantly and there was expected to be short term impacts in terms of officer availability and workforce planning.
  - Significant change in leadership positions – a new Chief Officer team in place and significant changes in personnel at senior ranks across both Local Policing and Protective Services.
  - Fit for the Future – in 2020 the force launched its Fit for the Future strategy based around the three pillars of Prevent and Protect, Respond and Reassure and Effective and Efficient.
  - A new Police and Crime Plan – following the 2021 PCC elections a new police and crime plan for the force was launched, which extends to 2025.
  - Full separation from West Mercia Police in terms of shared services – whilst the alliance termination triggered the establishment of a number of standalone services in October 2019 and March 2020, a number of residual services were still shared/hosted. The final one of these, the ICT separation, only completed in early 2022.
  - A completely new standalone ICT platform – linked to above, the force invested heavily to rebuild our ICT capability from scratch, and this provided many new capabilities and opportunities which we needed to exploit through new ways of working.
  - Greater understanding of the standalone financial position for the force – the alliance finances were split on a 31%/69% basis. Whilst this was simple, separating out functions on a phased basis presented challenges but left us in a stronger position. This is combined with our longer-term medium term financial plan and the key influences (precept, government grant) provided a healthier view on the financial planning requirements for the force.
  - Improving availability of data and evidence on the force activities - access and understanding of data was much improved from the alliance position. We had a much stronger evidence base for decision making.

- 3.6. With the separation complete, and to address the drivers and opportunities above, the Evolve programme was closed and the force mobilised the Empower programme, which was the umbrella identity for three change programmes, People, Place & Technology. This report focuses on the closure of Phase 1 of the Empower People programme.



## 4. Design Phase

### Initial Terms of Reference (ToR) and Design Principles

- 4.1. The ToR that underpinned the programme was developed in two stages between December 2021 and January 2022. This involved extensive engagement with Chief Officers and senior stakeholders.
- 4.2. In summary, the Chief Officers directed that the strategic intent and objectives for the operating model review are as below:
- Ensure the operating model supports and is aligned to delivery of the Police and Crime Plan and Fit for the Future Strategy, specifically the 5 areas of strategic intent identified by the Chief Constable:
    - Engagement and visibility.
    - Proactive and Preventive.
    - Health and Wellbeing.
    - Partnership Leverage.
    - Customer Service focus and victim care.
  - Ensure our operating model is designed and delivered to operate effectively within the financial parameters of the MTFP.

- Identify opportunities for cashable and non-cashable (efficiency) savings enabling the force to invest and grow the business.
- Deliver an operating model with clear lines of ownership and accountability to drive better performance.
- Integrate the benefits from our investment in people and technology and leverage the competitive benefits of the force.
- All services and directorates were within the initial scope, but it was acknowledged that in the early phase there will be areas that come out of scope where significant change is not required.
- Ensure resources are best matched to current and future demand, delivering a flexible operating model that can respond effectively to changes in demand and take measures to reduce demand.
- Any decisions and recommendations must be underpinned by data and a strong evidence base.
- Inform and be informed by the two other major change programmes the force was progressing in Empower Place and Empower Tech.

## Options Refinement and Design

- 4.3.** Following agreement of the terms of reference in January 2022, the programme mobilised a small central design team initially with three leads, broadly aligned to Protective Services, Local Policing and Enabling Services, alongside identification of SPOCs from key business areas to work closely with the programme and support options analysis.
- 4.4.** In parallel, the programme implemented robust governance structures, both internally within the programme to ensure clear lines of ownership and deliverables, and with the establishment of the Empower People Board to enable the SRO to hold the programme to account and as an escalation point for the programme.
- 4.5.** To ensure the small team worked efficiently (noting a challenging delivery timeframe of May 2022 for the business case), an early objective was to identify those areas which would receive little or no attention, for example where it is clear that the current model is already optimal, where potential gains are likely to be marginal, or where the current structures had only just been implemented (e.g. Transactional Services).
- 4.6.** Targeted early consultation and engagement was undertaken with all levels of the workforce, including senior and external stakeholders. Given the scope of the programme, specific areas for consultation were identified beforehand to ensure the engagement phase of the programme was as focused and effective as possible. The quality and consistency of the consultation and engagement has been identified as strength of the change process as part of this post implementation review.
- 4.7.** This enabled the programme to identify the themes / business areas that were prioritised for detailed options analysis. This included:

- Functional v Geographical Command.
- Volume Crime Investigations.
- Public Contact and Incident Resolution.
- Shift Patterns.
- Protective Services.

- 4.8.** Options were developed between January 2022 and May 2022. These options were developed through a combination of qualitative analysis, including workshops, focus groups and extensive engagements with senior leads and other stakeholders (including Unison and the Federation), and quantitative data analysis (demand, performance, and data driven modelling work including with support of external consultancy – Process Evolution) to understand where the greatest impact and benefit can be realised.
- 4.9.** As the options developed, the programme maintained close communication with Chief Officers to ensure strategic alignment, communicate progress and test thinking. This proved critical in keeping the options phase of the programme manageable, focused, and able to meet the May 2022 timeframe.
- 4.10.** As an example, discussions around geographic and functional models evolved significantly during this phase. The initial direction was to deliver six separate models – geographic, functional and hybrid, each with a £1m and £3m savings option. As the design work progressed, certain options naturally come to the forefront, whilst others were discounted quickly.
- 4.11.** Following further engagement, scoping and prioritisation, the final direction from Chief Officers, in addition to the above, was to ensure the operating model delivers:
- Operating model options that deliver no savings, £1m of savings and £3m of savings.
  - Clear lines of ownership and accountability to drive better performance.
  - Improved volume crime investigation model.
  - Improved RASSO investigations (in line with VAWG work).
  - Improved intelligence function - addressing capacity and structural issues.
  - Improved approach to Prevention.
  - Front offices that remain open.
  - A dedicated Trafficking and Exploitation Capability (HMI C AFI).
  - Resolved OCSET backlogs.
  - Increased cyber and digital capacity.

## Final Business Case

- 4.12.** The detailed options were presented at a Chief Officer planning session in May 2022. Three separate models with over 41 recommendations were presented in line with the Terms of Reference:



- The preferred model that delivered no savings and retained the existing cost base.
  - A second model that delivered £1m in savings.
  - A third model that delivered £3m in savings.
- 4.13.** Underpinned by detailed structure charts, design and costings, the core structure across all three models was the same, however the preferred model delivered a range of enhanced capabilities that the other two models did not.
- 4.14.** The three core directorates introduced by Evolve remained across the three models: Local Policing, Protective Services and Enabling Services.
- 4.15.** All three models represented a fundamental change in the way Local Policing services are delivered, with the introduction of three Local Policing Areas in the north, south and east. Patrol and Safer Neighbourhood Teams would form part of each Local Policing Area, along with newly created Patrol Investigations Units and Local Policing Resolution Centres. Local commanders would have greater autonomy for the deployment of local resources, and greater accountability for performance. A new Prevention Hub would be created, demonstrating Warwickshire Police's commitment to preventing crime before it happens.
- 4.16.** Protective Services would also be subject of a significant overhaul, with the creation of a new Public Protection Unit. Innovative Domestic Abuse, Rape and Serious Sexual Offence Teams (DART) are created, putting the force in a strong position to tackle violence against women and girls. New capabilities would be brought online to address gaps in existing service delivery, and teams that were previously under pressure due to increasing demand, were proposed to be strengthened. A new Intelligence Hub would be created to provide enhanced 24/7 intelligence support.
- 4.17.** Whilst much of Enabling Services remained largely unchanged, the Learning and Development department would be strengthened, addressing concerns around the force's capacity to deliver essential training.
- 4.18.** Over and above any savings, 25 police officer posts were removed from the preferred model, creating a bank of 25 unallocated posts. The previous model, built on the full allocation of 1100 officer posts proved problematic for the force, due to the constant need for temporary roles, and the difficulty sustaining officer numbers at or near 1100. This innovation, whilst challenging to achieve, sought to create a more realistic model, reducing vacancies and ensuring teams have the right number of officers to meet their demands and deliver quality policing services.

**4.19.** A summary of the three models that were considered is provided below.

Capability	Preferred Option	£1m Savings Option	£3m Savings Option
3 x LP areas	✓	✓	✓
Patrol Investigation Unit	✓	✓	✓
LP Resolution Centres	✓	✓	✓
Patrol 4 shift pattern	✓	✓	✓
Roads Policing Sergeants	✓	✓	✓
DA AND RASSO teams (DART)	✓	✓	✓
Enhanced OCSET & RSOMU	✓	✓	✓
Enhanced Digital Capability	✓	✓	✓
Insight Team	✓	✓	✓
Enhanced Training Department	✓	✓	✓
Redesigned Public Contact	✓	Reduced	Reduced
Trafficking and Exploitation Team	✓	✓	Reduced
Model built on 1070 officers	✓	Reduced	Reduced
Retains current SNT numbers	✓	✓	
Prevention Hub	✓	✓	
Out of Court Disposals Team	✓		
High Risk OMU	✓		

**4.20.** Based on the strengthened financial position of the force, the Chief approved the no savings model to maximise the outcomes and benefits against the original strategic intent. Following detailed discussion at the planning session, not all 41 recommendations were taken forward. The final scope of the change the programme would deliver were as follows:

- A model based on 1075 police officers, not 1100.
- Create Local Policing Areas in the north, south and east – each under the leadership of a Chief Inspector.
- Introduce a four-shift system across Patrol.
- Introduce Patrol Investigation Units (PIUs).
- Introduce Local Policing Resolution Centres in each Local Policing Area.
- Transform the Harm Hub into a new Prevention Hub, with a clear focus on prevention.
- Reintroduce Roads Policing Sergeants and remove the fifth shift.
- Create a Public Protection Unit.
- Introduce dedicated Rape, Serious Sexual Offence and High-Risk Domestic Abuse teams (DART).
- Enhance the CATE function by introducing dedicated trafficking and exploitation resources alongside the child abuse teams.
- Create a Strategic Development Team within Public Protection.
- Increase the size of OCSET.
- Create an enhanced and rebranded central intelligence function, renamed as 'Intel Hub' with a mix of police officers and police staff.
- Increase the size of the Registered Sex Offender Management Unit (RSOMU).
- Double the number of force Digital Media Investigators from three to six.
- Introduce a dedicated Cyber Prevent role into the operating model.

## Alignment of the Final Business Case to the Strategic Intent

**4.21.** In agreeing the final scope, the five areas of Strategic Intent identified by the Chief Constable at the start of the design phase were reviewed by the programme to provide assurance that the new model will deliver against that Strategic Intent. The outcome of this review was presented in the final, baseline business case and is summarised below:

- **Engagement and Visibility:** The proposed model would deliver a clear focus on engagement and visibility. Neighbourhood policing has been the cornerstone of policing in Warwickshire for many years and has been consistently considered a strength in various recent inspections. The force has embraced a problem-solving mentality, which is embedded throughout its neighbourhood teams. The proposed model retains neighbourhood policing and problem solving at the heart of the model.
- **Proactive and Preventive:** Throughout the model there is a common theme of prevention, supporting the Prevent and Protect strand of the Fit for the Future Strategy. Whether tackling local problems, targeting the highest risk offenders or supporting perpetrators to break their offending cycle, there is a strong focus on prevention.
- **Health and Wellbeing:** The model builds capacity into the areas that are struggling, supporting Warwickshire Police's wider wellbeing programme. Overall numbers within core front line departments such as Patrol and investigative teams are maintained.
- **Partnership Leverage:** The proposed model strengthens capability in key partnership areas such as public protection and crime prevention. The ongoing commitment to neighbourhood policing and geographic leadership will allow local partnership to continue to flourish across all districts and boroughs.
- **Customer Service Focus and Victim Care:** A challenge for policing is to allocate sufficient specialist resources to target high or complex threats that impact a relatively small percentage of the population, whilst at the same time maintaining a mainstream resource base that can deliver a quality service across areas of volume demand. The operating model strikes that balance – growing capacity in high-risk specialist areas but implementing a fresh approach to volume demand to improve outcomes and victim satisfaction.

### Lessons Learned

#### Resource / People

- A smaller, central design team, comprised of police leads and SMEs, with clear roles and responsibilities was the right approach for the design stage. It allowed for agility and focus against tight timeframes.
- The extraction of the Duties Manager was a necessary step. It significantly shortcut the discussions and input required to understand shift patterns, PSLs, structures etc. It would have been necessary to lean heavily on Duties regardless, so this enabled Duties to reallocate resource for BAU while providing the programme team SME capability to move quickly.
- Seniority (and experience) within the design team is critical to move at pace. Ch Supt leadership, backed by other senior police leads enabled the team to access and navigate through the organisation. This is true for Heads of Service engagement, but also to ensure the design team can 'manage up' with the Chief Officers.
- The identification of SPOCs was important. This ensured the programme had access points to business areas, manage expectations on roles and responsibilities, and ensured business area input into the process was robust.
- The Chief Officers were heavily engaged throughout the process, both to set the terms of reference clearly up front (which was critical to ensure strategic alignment of the design / options) and through the options and design phase to guide the evolution. This was key to the team delivering the business case that satisfied the Chief Officers in a short timeframe.
- Close alignment with HR is key during the design phase. This is to ensure policy and procedure grounds the options (as they relate to people) and also to ensure the management of change process (resource allocation and timeframes) are appropriately factored into the delivery plans.

#### Communications and Engagement

- Similarly, close alignment with Corporate Communications was critical during the options phase. Comms were engaged at the earliest stages of the programme and robust communications plans were developed and executed. However, comms delivery planning should also be factored into this as early as possible.
- As part of this report, detailed feedback has been sought from senior leads and other stakeholders. Feedback was consistent that engagement was well executed during the design phase. However, there was feedback that engagement during this phase was focused on the design and options (understandably) but there should have been a greater focus on how delivery will be progressed once approved. This will help business areas prepare (manage expectations with staff and ensure appropriate resources are made available), rather than play catch-up.
- Feedback was also provided that that business area input at the early stages of the options development was strongly sought, but as the options were refined, opportunities for business area critique lessened as the focus was increasingly on the Chief Officer position. While this is natural as the decisions sit with the Chiefs, consideration should be given to greater 'explanation' of the direction of travel once options are maturing. Otherwise, good work can be forgotten for a sense that the engagement hasn't translated into being 'listened to'.
- Face-to-face engagement sessions with the rank and file were positively viewed and should be used for similar changes to win hearts and minds. It also reflects that any new model relies on the support of operational teams to execute the new ways of working.
- The partner briefing pack was well received from external partners. A similar product should be used for similar change going forward.

## 5. Programme Management

- 5.1.** The scope of the operating model change was agreed in late May 2022. While an initial assessment of the delivery timeline was carried out for the business case, the programme committed to having a baseline delivery plan by July/August 2022, with a requirement for the new model to be operational by April 2023.
- 5.2.** Producing a viable baseline plan had to reflect the complex people/resource picture. The business case recognised the biggest risk to delivery is officer recruitment and the time it takes to get officer numbers up to a level that allows specialist capabilities to be brought online, whilst maintaining core numbers within critical mainstream teams. This proved to be the case as explored in sections 6 and 7 of this report.
- 5.3.** To support development of the baseline plan and ensure effective programme management, there were changes in the team to bring in the additional skills required. The original design team consisted of
- Ch Supt Mike Smith (Lead).
  - Supt Jill Fowler.
  - CI Karl Faulkner.
  - DCI Inspector Dave Andrews.
  - DI Chris Cooke.
  - T/CI Steve Pittam.
  - Ibbby Ahmed.
- 5.4.** Moving to delivery, Mike Smith, Karl Faulkner, Dave Andrews, and Ibbby were retained, with Chris Cooke and Jill Fowler called back into business area leadership. Additional resources and SME were abstracted into the programme, including:
- Sgt Wes Gladwin.
  - Charlotte Mackay (HR and Management of Change).
  - Megan Wilson (HR Systems / structure change).
  - Tom Kane (Business Analysis for LPRC).
  - Neil Reid (PM for LPRC).
- 5.5.** The programme structured itself into key workstreams, with the Empower People Programme Board governance retained (reporting through to Change Board). The workstreams were as follows:
- WS1: LPAs.
  - WS2: Local Policing resolution Centres.
  - WS3: OCC & IMU.
  - WS3: OPU & Ops Support.
  - WS5: Force CID / DART.
  - WS6: Protective Services (OCSET, DMI etc).
  - WS7: Intel Hub.
  - WS8: Prevention Hub.
  - WS9: Enabling and Financial Services.
  - WS10: System Updates (Origin, Duties, etc).
  - WS11: Management of Change (tasks across all people change).

- 5.6.** Specific areas of operating model change are reviewed in section 6 and 7 of this report. The critical path for the delivery had to plan and align multiple thematic and interdependent programme management activities. These thematic areas are discussed below as they required extensive programme management effort (and business area support) that if not completed correctly would have significantly delayed the model.

## **Management of Change**

- 5.7.** The extensive changes to the operating model required the programme to apply the management of change process. This was one of the largest applications of that process undertaken by Warwickshire Police involving restructure, system changes, multiple shift pattern changes, new role profiles, Hay evaluations, duties preferences/postings and associated statutory consultations with Unison, the Federation, officers, and staff.
- 5.8.** Extraction of HR Business Partner support, Duties SME and HR Systems SME was critical to providing the planning, capacity and capability to navigate these processes. This could not have been achieved through business as usual. The programme correctly recognised this at the start of the process and secured the necessary resource to the programme. This helped ensure the baseline delivery plan was realistic and achievable.
- 5.9.** Stakeholder management with Unison and the Federation was a key factor in the programme moving at the pace. Regular meetings and engagement sessions were held to ensure a no surprises approach and to smooth the application of the management of change process / resolve concerns at the earliest possible stage.
- 5.10.** Workforce Planning was a key challenge for the programme. Allocating people to posts in the new teams (particularly the specialist teams) required careful sequencing to ensure that the people were available and trained, and that existing teams could release them while maintaining their service. This was a driver for the April 2023 date (rather than earlier) and it was necessary to launch teams with vacancies. Workforce Planning data is a weakness within the force, and this process relied on professional judgement and senior lead engagement, as much as it did quantitative HR and training data.
- 5.11.** However, the April 2023 date was realised and while a number of teams, particularly in Protective Services were not at establishment, a viable tipping point to launch the model was met as evidenced by the current position six-months on.

## **Estates / Fleet Planning**

- 5.12.** Empower Place mobilised a project to manage the planning and logistics of the estates implications of the new operating model. This was governed and reported on via the Empower Place Programme Board with matrix reporting to the Empower People Board.
- 5.13.** The programme provided the Estates team with the new team structures and location principles. The Estates team analysed options for how this can be accounted for within the estate footprint. Based on this analysis, senior leads “locked” locations for specific teams, and Chief Officers decided that the aspiration to centralise all none “geographic” functions at LW would not be implemented and instead progress a “low impact” approach to people movement (i.e. only where operationally necessary).

- 5.14.** This was an important decision to ensure the model could be delivered by April 2023 and to reduce the complexity of the management of change process / estates implementation process. It also meant the Estates team could take a longer-term view to location planning at an organisational level. A further consideration was limited resource in the Estates team and their focus on the condition uplift work as a priority for Empower Place following the exit from the alliance.
- 5.15.** While the overall level of estates change was reduced, there was still considerable change required (such as for Local Policing Resolution Centres and for the new teams in Protective Services). The programme engaged the Estates team early, provided clear business requirements, coordinated direction with the Chiefs, and worked productively with Estates throughout the process. There was minimal negative feedback on the planning / execution captured during the review.
- 5.16.** Senior leads report fleet as an issue and that the current distribution does not reflect the model. This is anticipated to become an increasing issue. As new recruits are trained they will be ready to single crew and require vehicles. There is currently significant double crewing due to tutoring.
- 5.17.** Fleet allocation and fleet replacement is not an issue that the programme can solve directly. Fleet replacement planning is a project being taken forward by Empower Place and new capabilities such as Telematics are coming on stream that will provide a richer picture of where vehicles are and usage, so reallocation / replacement strategies can be implemented. At this stage fleet is a frustration being taken forward via BAU channels.

### Crime Allocation Model (CAM)

- 5.18.** Grounded in the original design principles and strategic intent, the operating model represents a significant change to the process and practice of crime management. For example, the introduction of Patrol Investigation Units, and new specialist teams in Protective Services. The programme recognised that to support new ways of working and to smooth the operational rollout and understanding of the model, a new Crime Allocation Model would be required.
- 5.19.** The CAM was produced against three principles:
- Aim to resolve the investigation at the first point of contact where appropriate.
  - Ensure the most appropriate individual or team is investigating.
  - Ensure the fewest number of handovers between individuals or teams.
- 5.20.** The CAM provides the process for allocation based on type/classification, solvability, proportionality, and risk assessment with associated crime allocation tables by team informed by these criteria.
- 5.21.** The CAM was discussed extensively with senior leads as part of the post implementation review. The consensus was:
- The CAM is an important tool and a welcome output of the programme in supporting the rollout and operation of the new model.



- There are challenges with the application of the CAM. However, these should be considered as BAU challenges (allocation, reallocation between teams) that any CAM will face where investigations evolve, new information becomes available, or the investigation does not neatly align to one crime type.
- For example, some areas are black and white such as all residential burglaries going to SOAC. But many crimes are a grey area and as they progress categorisation can change. The CAM gives a framework, but it requires leadership and pragmatism to ensure that the right team ownership is balanced with positive outcomes / customer considerations / speed of resolution.
- Six-months into the new model, we have additional data on which teams are holding what crimes, and how aligned that is to the CAM and the design principles of the operating model. As such a further review is now taking place on improvements that can be made to the CAM which will be implemented in Q4 23/24.

## Communications

- 5.22.** Communications is a critical component of major organisational change. The general consensus from senior lead feedback gathered as part of this review, is that the communications were of a high standard throughout the process.
- 5.23.** The programme had extensive senior communications support via Laura Thompson, Deputy Head of Corporate Communications, and Kate Quilley, Head of Corporate Communications.
- 5.24.** The programme agreed a communications strategy and plan, and a stakeholder management plan early in the delivery process. The approach was multi-channel (face to face, electronic and print) and focused on consistent and frequent messaging from Chief Officers and senior leads alongside direct programme to officer/staff engagement sessions.
- 5.25.** Key activities included support for:
- May-July 2022: Face to face engagement seminars that were used to give a consistent overview of the rationale for change and plans for new organisational structures, including facilitated Q&A published on the intranet afterwards.
  - Aug-Nov 22: Direct Q&A sessions with teams (e.g. Patrol), Webinars, Video Messages from the DCC and extensive intranet updates early in the delivery process to explain the proposed changes and the implementation processes (management of change etc).
  - Dec-Feb 23: A 'golden-thread' approach of building Empower People communications into general organisational news, alongside targeted communication using multi-channels. The focus was on the new structures, postings progress, and general progress on new team set-up, office space and shift pattern changes. This was direct messaging to officers and staff, various products targeted at senior leads, and products for senior leads to own and cascade.
  - Mar-May 23: As above but with addition of the Empower Briefing Days to introduce senior leads of the new teams, ensure understanding of roles and responsibilities, estates planning and outline the cut-over plan.
- 5.26.** In addition, an external stakeholder management and communications plan was developed and executed. This included the approach to consultation and engagement with key external partners and media engagement including a media forum held in March-23.



- 5.27.** Workforce engagement and messaging continued throughout April / May 23 to support the successful implementation of the new policing model and aligned to the original Empower Communications Strategy. This was supported by senior officer visibility and corporate messaging and updates. There was positive and widespread local media reporting on the implementation.

## Programme Management Lessons Learned

Lessons Learned
<p><b>Programme Management</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>While this was police led change, the programme would have benefited from an experienced project manager to support planning and increase the capacity of the programme team. As the wider PM team was heavily ICT contractor focused an inexperienced project manager was allocated to the programme but the value add was limited and they moved on quickly. A change of this nature is niche to policing and very internally process driven. The change team should ensure it maintains a level of people change PM capability in its permanent team to support operating model change going forward.</li> <li>Seniority of the programme team, particularly for police led change, is critical. As per the design phase, this enabled the team to navigate through the organisation more effectively and deal with Head of Service as peers.</li> <li>With a smaller central team, the identification of SPOCs in each business areas to own the communications and embedding of new ways of working was effective. However, thematic feedback from senior leads identified that greater planning and engagement with them from the central team, earlier in the process, would have allowed them to better plan for this and make resource available alongside BAU demands. Significant demand was placed on the SPOCs often at the expense of their equally demanding BAU role.</li> <li>MS Teams worked well as a collaborative tool, document storage tool, and as a planning tool. It also provided visibility to the broader Empower programme for governance and assurance purposes.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Management of Change</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Extraction of HR BP, HR Systems SME and Duties SME resources is critical for a programme of this size. This cannot be done through BAU while staying on plan against an ambitious deadline.</li> <li>Informal engagement / stakeholder management with Unison and the Federation and a 'no-surprises approach' streamlines the consultation process and should be an underlying principle for future change.</li> <li>It is important to extensively communicate with officers and staff on the process being followed, progress being made, and why the changes are happening. This allows the programme / force to control the narrative, as change is not welcome by all or commonly understood.</li> <li>Workforce Planning data is a weakness and the programme team had to rely on professional judgement to plan what resources could be released when into new teams to reach the viable go-live tipping point. A Workforce Planning Gold Group has since been launched to improve the management information position.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Estates / Fleet Planning</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Estates must be engaged as early as possible and estates delivery must be on the critical path in the implementation plan. The Estates team struggles with capacity and early planning is important.</li> </ul>

- Fleet is a consistent issue raised in the feedback from senior leads, as the allocation is viewed to not match the changes to the model. These issues are being managed via BAU with Fleet, and new technologies coming on-stream will help address this.

#### **Communications**

- Feedback from the Head of Communications identified that future programmes must ensure appropriate communications considerations as part of project design and development and not simply alongside delivery. This will allow for better communications planning and resource allocation.
- Further, we should ensure manager and supervisor briefings are prioritised as they are key to controlling the narrative with their teams and championing change (and embedding that change once landed)
- Chief Officer visibility, ownership and leadership is fundamental to extensive change such as this.

#### **Crime Allocation Model**

- A further review of the model is required now that we have additional performance data and allocation data. This review has commenced and will report in Q4 24/25. Ownership and actions will be agreed by the ACCs.
- A CAM is only a framework – senior leads need to collaboratively work together to ensure allocation is aligned to demand / public service considerations.

## 6. Local Policing Post Implementation Review

### Local Policing Areas

#### Summary of Change

The functional command across most of Local Policing was replaced with three geographic command areas, each under the leadership of a Chief Inspector. One Superintendent has responsibility for all three LPAs. Patrol, Patrol Investigation Units (PIU), Safer Neighbourhood Teams and Local Policing Resolution Centres all form part of the LPA.

Local Policing Commanders have the authority to deploy resources as they see fit, move resources between teams if necessary, or create bespoke teams to tackle local problems, drive local performance or manage high demand areas.

The followings falls under local policing command:

- Patrol
- Safer Neighbourhoods
- Patrol Investigation Units
- Local Policing Resolution Centres
- Mental Health Triage (north and south only)

The model delivers local Inspectors with a forward-facing focus, free from reactive demand, which is transferred to a cohort of twelve Force Incident Managers / Force Duty Inspectors.

In the north and south there are five Inspectors, broken down as follows:

- 2 x SNT
- 2 x Patrol
- 1 x PIU and Local Policing Resolution Centre

In the east there are three Inspectors, broken down as follows:

- 1 x SNT
- 1 x Patrol
- 1 x PIU and Local Policing Resolution Centre

## Review Outcomes

The review has identified no significant issues with the implementation and principles of the three LPAs and single leadership of each LPA under a Chief Inspector. Of all the areas analysed as part of this review, the data and feedback has been universally positive on this change.

As with all areas of the model, this must be subject to continuous improvement and performance monitoring, but it can be said with confidence that the (emerging) benefits of the change are aligned with the design intent.

Common thematic outcomes identified in this review are:

- There is clearer ownership and accountability for driving performance across Local Policing.
- Single ownership is enabling the surge of resource to meet demand.
- A single Chief Inspector for each area is resulting in positive partner and community feedback. The continuity of the Chief Inspector fronting local issues is enabling stronger local engagement and representation.
- The Chief Inspectors have developed strong relationships with partners. They take responsibility for problem solving and responding to community concerns and are the force representative at community meetings. This has resulted in far greater hyper-local communications opportunities to increase public confidence and engage with key stakeholders.
- There is a healthy competitive performance culture building between the areas.

There are two points of note:

- Ultimately success will be judged against strong performance improvements. These are yet to be realised but there should be confidence this change will enable this as resources begin to stabilise and the model embeds in.
- The Chief Inspectors have large roles and there is significant administration required (multiple meetings, diary appointment etc). Based on feedback, consideration should be given to PA support for the roles to enable them to focus their capacity in more productive areas.

## Residual Activity

Ch Supt Local Policing to note and consider feedback on enhancing PA support for the 3 x LPA Chief Inspectors. This will be taken forward as part of BAU team / resource management.

### Summary of Change

#### FIM/FDI

The OCC Inspector (OCCI) role was one of the most important roles in the organisation with responsibility for coordinating the immediate response to critical or major incidents. OCCIs were all accredited Initial Tactical Firearms Commanders (ITFCs). The new model created a hybrid OCCI and cadre Inspector role, cross skilling a wider cohort of Inspectors and building overall resilience.

The OCCI role was renamed as Force Incident Manager (FIM). FIM is a common term used across most forces to describe the control room Inspector, whereas OCCI is a specific term introduced during the previous West Mercia alliance. The cadre role was titled the Force Duty Inspector (FDI).

There is a cohort of twelve Inspectors across four shifts, providing three Inspectors on each shift. This allows for a minimum of two to be on duty at any one time, one to undertake the FIM role and the other to undertake the FDI role. At times all three Inspectors are on duty, leaving the third to either support the FIM or FDI in line with demands at that particular time. The Inspectors also have core portfolios which are to be completed when all three are on duty.

The Inspectors work as a team and their core tasks include:

- All current OCCI duties.
- Initial firearms command.
- Initial ground command of any serious or critical incidents.
- Missing person reviews.
- Custody reviews.

Following further review in Q3 23/24, significant changes to this approach have been designed and will go live in January 2024 (see review outcomes below).

#### Additional Changes

- All Telephone Investigator roles were removed from Public Contact (absorbed into LPRCs).
- Reduced the number of IMU staff from 20 to 16, and moved IMU to a four shift system with skeleton staffing only overnight.
- Reduced the number of Resolution Centre Supervisors from seven to three.
- Increased the number of DDMs from three to four.
- Removed all Switchboard posts. While the posts are removed, three staff still in place (on the triage desk). This will be reviewed in OCC Phase 2.

## Review Outcomes

The review has concluded that the principles of the FIM/FDI model are sound and are broadly supported by senior leads, however, there are common thematic concerns around the resourcing of the model. Issues include:

- The FDI/FIM model being significantly under-resourced with county-cover FDI being the norm. This does not allow for effective management of risk and demand.
- A lack of ownership of incidents at Tasking.
- Several occasions where due to demand on the FIM/Duty Inspector, little oversight has been provided to high risk missing person enquiries.
- Confusion about the FDI and FIM role and how this integrates with Local Policing Inspectors.
- Lack of clarity for Duty Superintendents on the role of the previous OCCI vs FIM vs Local Inspectors. This means it is not always clear who has responsibility or command for a particular incident.
- A lack of visibility of resources and a requirement for an improved view of PSLs from across the force (LP and PS), and access to those PSLs / who is on duty and where more reliably. A recommendation for a further review of Duties is outlined in the Operations section of this report.

While elements of these issues are expected as the FIM/FDIs are new and central roles in the management of demand, these issues were known to Chief Officers ahead of this review and steps are being taken to address them. Local Policing command has completed a review and changes will take place from January 2024 to mitigate. This includes:

- 4 core Inspectors in room.
- Shift Inspectors who are all TFC trained.
- 2 Inspectors out and 1 in room.
- A minimum of 3 per day.
- Inspectors aligned to shifts to drive performance.

A specific area of demand impacted by this is MISPERs. The changes in January above are expected to help mitigate this. The overall MISPER process requires review including the role / impact of the central team vs. the day-to-day response. The Change Team has allocated a Business Analyst to map this process and work with the business area on process improvement opportunities.

No issues were identified with the wider resource changes in Public Contact.

## Residual Activity

Implement January 2024 FIM Inspector changes as agreed with Chief Officers.

MISPER team to progress process improvement work in conjunction with the business areas. A business analyst will provide support will process mapping / analysis.

### Summary of Change

#### Patrol Shift Pattern

Patrol previously worked a five-shift system consisting of six days on followed by four days off. In order to deliver the proposed model, it was necessary to move Patrol to a four-shift system, on a four-on-four off pattern. The move to a four-shift system was an enabler for the Patrol Investigation Units to free up resources.

The four-shift system was introduced across Patrol. The pattern removed inefficiencies from the previous shift overlaps and was a better match of resource levels to demand. Enhanced policing capability on Friday and Saturday nights was introduced by rostering all SNT and PIU officers to work one in every five Friday or Saturday nights.

During the engagement phase, this change proved popular with the Federation and Patrol Officers. The four rest days between nights and days allows for a full recovery from night shifts and promotes health and wellbeing.

#### Patrol Investigations Units

The majority of volume crime was investigated by Patrol. The only exceptions to this were those low level crimes progressed by Telephone Investigators, and a small number of community crimes that are allocated to SNTs.

The previous approach to investigating volume crime was problematic. A Patrol Officer's primary responsibility is to respond to emergency and priority incidents, and any investigative work can only be progressed when officers are free from the need to respond to new incidents. It is very difficult for officers to plan investigative activity on a day-to-day basis, as often the incident demand supersedes any planned activity. Increasingly, the incident response demand leaves insufficient time for Patrol as a function to effectively manage its investigative demand.

The new model saw the creation of Patrol Investigation Units (PIU) in each of the three Local Policing Areas. The PIUs have responsibility for the investigations of a pre-defined list of crime types, which would include all medium risk domestic abuse. The PIUs do not have responsibility for all volume crime - lower risk and more straightforward crime types would still be investigated by Patrol. A full crime allocation model was agreed as part of the implementation programme.

The PIU shift pattern was designed as a 5 shift system consisting of six working days followed by four rest days.

In the north and south each of the five PIU shifts have a dedicated sergeant aligned to the shift. Due to the smaller team sizes, 2 sergeants manage the 5 eastern PIU shifts. In all areas a dedicated PIU Inspector manages the PIU teams, reporting directly to the Local Policing Chief Inspector. The PIU Inspector has clear accountability for investigations standards, outcomes and file quality.

## Review Outcomes

Local Policing command and other stakeholders consulted are positive on the implementation of the PIUs. The introduction of PIUs is a real benefit in that the more complex timely investigations can be dealt with expeditiously and this is expected to improve outcomes and file quality as officers become more skilled.

The PIUs are proving to be a more efficient allocation of resources and the quality of investigations is improving and will continue to improve as the training and investigative capability increases over time (for both operational and leadership resources). There is a strong push from LP command to translate this into increased outcomes and victim satisfaction. Improvements have not yet translated into outcomes and this will need to be monitored carefully.

An initial challenge was a lack of stability in PIU supervisory resources, particularly Sergeants. Vacancies and redeployments impacted the ability to maximise support/effectiveness and consistency, however this risk is reducing as the team reaches a steady state.

Minor concerns were raised around the individual workloads of the staff within the PIU and that this may prevent the improvement in performance the force had hoped for. Management of capacity is an ongoing issue in a number of areas, and not specific to PIU, however this will also need to be monitored. Having said that, to meet design, PIU crime allocation needs to increase. Inexperience and volume of turnover constrains this, however growing experience and stability over time will in return, address this. CPD and training should be a priority for the PIU.

The visibility of the PIU, as a new team, should be considered. Accepting PIU are part of the LPA, the LPA commanders can't be expected to know the full details of investigations and demand, and PIU are not represented at daily tasking, yet hold much of our volume crime investigations / workload. This means that it is difficult to fully assess demand across the force in totality at daily tasking. Having said that, they are represented at a portfolio level, so this is not a specific issue for the PIU but something to consider as a new and important team.

PSD provided feedback that there has been insufficient local accountability at Patrol Insp level which has proved challenging. Specifically, around investigation standards and missing person reviews. It is expected that PSD and Patrol leadership will take this forward directly.

Finally, while not specific to the new model, arrest rates are identified as an issue. The force has a young workforce in Patrol and we need to make sure the culture around them is an enabler. An example debated at the Chief Officer review, was of Custody Sgts pushing away demand – which will discourage young Patrol officers from arresting. Acknowledging better performing forces for outcomes and victim satisfaction all have higher arrest rates, the Chiefs have taken quick action to move Custody leadership out of Criminal Justice and into Local Policing command.

It was also noted that Athena continues to be a challenging system. The new V6 upgrade launching in Q4 23/24 is expected to improve this. Change will work with operational areas for training and issue resolution.

## Residual Activity

Implement structural management changes for Custody from CJ to Communities and Response.



### Summary of Change

LPRCs were created in each LPA, merging a number of existing functions and reinstating walk-in facilities at four locations across the county. The teams have responsibility for:

- Telephone investigations and crime recording.
- Servicing any walk-in demand at front offices.
- All other existing front office demand.
- Incident progression via telephone or video call.

The teams consist of both officers and staff. The staff primarily take on the more transactional elements of the previous front office role, whereas the officers use their skills primarily in recording and investigating crime and progressing incidents. However, there is a significant cross over of skills with officers and staff being able to carry out the majority of each other's roles. The teams are based at the existing front office locations of Nuneaton; Rugby; Leamington; Stratford (team based at Leamington principally, with one member at Stratford each day).

The teams fall under the command of the Local Policing Chief Inspector, and are line managed by a Local Policing Sergeant. The team is closely aligned to both Patrol and the PIU – supporting those teams in a number of ways. By aligning the teams to Local Policing, rather than a central function, the productivity and performance of individuals within those teams can be very closely monitored to ensure they are taking as much demand as possible away from Patrol and the PIUs.

By merging these functions, economies of scale are leveraged and downtime is reduced. Some efficiency savings are generated which allow for investment in higher risk areas of policing.

### Review Summary

The review has not identified significant issues with the LPRCs. The objective of keeping front counters open was achieved, ensuring this key customer service channel remained viable.

High volume / low-level demand has been reallocated away from the front-line to the LPRCs with a right first-time approach. Over half (53%) of all LPRC investigations are theft or criminal damage and over 75% of investigations are retained within the team which is positive.

The implementation of the LPRCs was more complex than originally envisioned. The Change Team allocated a PM and BA to support implementation, particularly to support the process mapping for the new teams and the technical implementation of the systems and equipment they rely on. However, this was managed successfully at a low overall cost.

There was direct feedback from a member of the LPRC who identified that there are ongoing equipment challenges (not enough computers) and that the equipment is not user friendly. Further it can be challenging to undertake telephone investigations in a noisy front counter office space, and that space is too small for the team. This has been passed to the Digital Services team for triage and LPRC leadership for further consideration.

### Residual Activity

N/A

### Summary of Change

Previously, there was a Chief Inspector post within Operations (Firearms, Roads Policing and Dogs), and a separate Chief Inspector post within Operations Support (Duties, Tactical Planning and Road Safety). The new model deleted a (vacant) Chief Inspector post, combining both areas under one portfolio. To balance the portfolio, Warwickshire Road Safety Unit was moved into under Criminal Justice leadership.

Operations (OPU) continued to maintain Roads, Firearms and Dogs as the three constituent parts.

The new model retains the same number of overall Firearms Officers but reduces the number of Firearms Sergeants to one per shift or five in total, whilst increasing the number of Firearms Constables by the same amount. Additional Firearms Sergeants were not redeployed but sat over establishment in a Constable post until Sergeant numbers naturally reduced to five.

The model had no impact on OFC (Operational Firearms Command) resilience as the OFC role is routinely carried out at Constable rank. The five Firearms sergeants no longer had responsibility for the management of RPOs or be required to manage the investigations into serious collisions. Firearms Officers remained on the five-shift system, working four on four off, with the fifth shift set aside for their extensive training requirements. However, Roads Policing's shift pattern was changed to a four-shift system to release capacity back into the wider model.

Roads Policing Sergeants were re-introduced providing a renewed career path for RPOs.

The Dog Section remained as it is, with ten Dog Handlers, a Dog Trainer and a Dog Liaison Officer but was changed to a four shift system.

[Please see next page](#)

## Review Summary

The review identified a issues with the OPU changes, however these must be understood in the context of the business area previously receiving growth and investment, and that when implementing broad operating model changes against competing demands, compromises have to be made. Force priorities are a key consideration in response to these issues.

The removal of the 5th shift (which is an enabler to free up capacity for other areas of the model), is a reduction in capacity and PSL resilience for Roads. This has also seen an impact on morale (decompressing after managing a fatal collision is necessary for health and wellbeing), and reduced capacity for national initiatives and cross border / OCG response. Overall, delivery effectiveness has been impacted.

The professional view of Roads leadership is that numbers are challenging and meeting PSL at times is difficult. Some operations will require specialist skills and training so utilising other areas of LP is not always an option (PG9, ab loads etc). The emerging business case for the exponential growth in ab loads activity to support HS2 and a how Roads responds to this (noting there is anticipated to be significant income generation) is an opportunity to review this.

Similarly, OPU leadership identify that the moving RPO shift away from AFO shift pattern has created a split in the teams. Shifts do now not directly align, causing interoperability issues with team working, supervision and health and wellbeing.

The Dog team have also moved to a four-shift pattern instead of AFO five shift pattern, causing challenges with dog licensing hours. Steps are being taken directly by LP leadership to revert Dogs back to a 5-shift system.

The introduction of Roads Policing sergeants as bespoke from Firearms Sergeants means that the two functions are further separated, making it more difficult to leverage firearms officers to become involved in roads policing activities.

The Supt for Operations has been tasked by Chief Officers to produce zero cost and costed options to address these challenges. As noted, this follow up review must also be undertaken in conjunction with the HS2 uplift business case for ab loads, which will create exponential demand for at least 12-24 months in this area and Roads will be required to support that.

While out of scope for this report, Duties feedback was also provided by several senior leads. This included the need for improved quick time management information via DMS, a consistent approach for Protective Services as there is for Local Policing, and improved forecasting. It is recommended that a review of Duties is carried out in 24/25.

## Residual Activity

Operations Supt to produce zero cost and costed options to address the issues identified in this report.

Consider a review of Duties in 24/25 to review process, practice and resourcing. For example, expanding the scope to Protective Services duties planning.

## 7. Protective Services Post Implementation Review

### Force Investigations

#### Summary of Change

The Force CID team reduced in numbers, reflecting the significant reduction in demand with all rape, serious sexual offending and high risk domestic abuse demand moving into the DART teams. The shift pattern was changed to a four-shift system. This change was supported by detailed modelling with external consultancy – Process Evolution.

Digital and Cyber was moved into Force Investigations. Cyber dependent crime and cyber enabled crime are increasing nationally and these trends are reflected in force. The three previous DMIs in Warwickshire had limited ability to provide assistance and advice in support of live investigations, at a time when the volume of investigations with a digital footprint is increasing.

To provide increased resilience, the Cyber & Digital Team increased from 3 to 6. This represents a substantial increase in DMI capacity. The change supports efforts to upskill the non-specialist workforce in areas of digital and cyber policing, through improved access to and increased opportunities to work alongside specialist DMIs. Additionally, an enhanced ability to identify digital evidence opportunities should reduce the length of investigations, improve the quality of investigations and increase opportunities to more effectively safeguard the vulnerable.

#### Review Summary

As noted, there were only minor changes to the Force Investigations, with elements of demand transferred to the new DART teams.

The number of Sergeants is proving sufficient only to manage incoming demand on a daily basis. There is regularly only one DS covering the county, and there is not sufficient resilience elsewhere across the county to constantly pull from other areas. The summer period especially saw high demand at times of low resilience and this has required DS to work rest day overtime. Supervisory capacity within FCID is an area of concern. The strong view of the Investigations leadership is that there are insufficient levels of first line supervision across FCID. Proposals to address this have been accepted via business planning and this should be carefully monitored.

A review is underway on the Crime Allocation Model (across PS and LP) to ensure clarity of process and application between teams with the right demand being managed by the right teams.

FCID must also work closely with the Prevention Hub to ensure that there are not gaps forming for lower-level investigations / SOC Level 1 that may not meet the threshold of the Prevention Hub but would have been picked up by the previous Harm Hub. This should be carefully monitored between Director of Intelligence and the Supts for Prevention, FCID and Local Policing (SNT).

No issues were identified with the Cyber and Digital growth. This additional capacity is welcome for a growing area of demand. Performance impacts will be tracked through BAU.

#### Residual Activity

Implement agreed supervisory uplift as agreed via BP. Supts for Intel, FCID, Prevention and LP to ensure there are no emerging crime allocation gaps for lower level investigations and SOC 1.

### Summary of Change

Multiple functions were realigned to form a Public Protection Unit (PPU). This replaced the existing Vulnerability and Safeguarding Unit. The PPU consists of:

- OCSET
- Central Referral and Safeguarding Unit (current HAU)
- Missing
- CATE
- DA and RASSO team (DART)
- Strategic Improvement

The new DART teams investigate all rape, serious sexual offences, and high-risk domestic abuse. Nationally there is a move towards the creation of specialist RASSO (rape and serious sexual offending teams), because of low conviction rates in all forces. There is significant overlap when investigating high risk 'relationship' based crime and serious sexual offences. The new model brought together:

- Rape and serious sexual offences (RASSO)
- High risk domestic abuse investigations

This provided a consistent approach to dealing with rape and serious sexual offences, both within relationships and non-relationship offences, and is expected to lead to improved outcomes for victims once those teams are fully established and embedded.

Dedicated trafficking and exploitation resources were built into the existing CATE teams. CATE teams are made up of

- CATE – child abuse
- CATE – trafficking and exploitation

The model recognised the very different nature of familiar child abuse and trafficking and exploitation. By keeping both teams under a wider CATE umbrella resources can be surged between teams to meet spikes in demand. The overall growth in this area of business recognises the increasing demands in the area of child protection and allows Warwickshire Police to continue to offer high levels of protection to vulnerable children.

A Detective Inspector and two Detective Sergeants form a Strategic Development Team to ensure the force remains as effective as possible across all 14 strands of public protection. The team is small compared to other forces but proportionate to the size of this force. The team enables the force to improve activity across all public protection strands, as well as ensuring compliance with national policy, guidance and best practice.

The growth in OCSET allows OCSET is an enabler to manage all online child sexual exploitation cases, ensuring offenders are brought to justice as swiftly as possible.

## Review Summary

As with other areas of the new model for Protective Services, Public Protection went live with a high number of vacancies and during a period of exceptionally high (complex) demand in the summer period.

While this was a good test of the model, it also means that time is required to fully understand the impact of the teams. As stressed throughout this report, data driven / KPI driven performance is tracked through multiple business as usual channels.

The professional view of the departmental leads is that the expanded capacity within specialist teams such as OCSET, DMI and Trafficking & Exploitation is enabling us to develop significantly in these areas and will support various HMICFRS requirements.

Based on the feedback and evidence collected through this review, the separation of DART and CID is allowing a greater focus and specialisation in these areas, as per the objectives of the design. Support for these changes was a consistent theme across the feedback from senior leads.

As stated, vacancy factor / resilience is, and will continue to be a constraint / risk. As smaller, specialist teams, this will have a disproportionate impact. This is now lowering, with the focus pivoting to training, development and building experience for the new teams. A single leadership structure for these teams will support the surging of resources where required and enable a more proactive approach to public protection. However, the DART model is 'lean' and will need to be monitored.

The resilience of sergeants across DART and CID has been difficult to maintain, resulting in regular county cover and having a challenging impact on investigative standards. Following a further review, additional supervisory capacity has been agreed for this area to address this.

There are concerns that investigators find it difficult to dedicate the time needed to thoroughly investigate RASSO cases as they are pulled to dealing with high-risk DA cases. The Supt from this area has received feedback from DCs, DS' and DIs to suggest they only have sufficient resilience to manage the demand from Domestic Abuse investigations, as they carry the most immediate risk, often with someone in custody. The RASSO investigations, because the risk is not so immediate, are often not getting the time and attention they deserve. This impacts on delivery of service to victims and the health and wellbeing of the investigators. As capacity and capability is built up in DART, this is expected to re-balance positively. However, this must be carefully monitored by Protective Services leadership and a further review of resource levels may be required if this concern is not reducing in Q4 23/24.

Feedback from leads is that the shift pattern changes have been well received and are a good match to demand.

## Residual Activity

Implementation of additional supervisory capacity, particularly at Sgt level. This has been agreed through business planning.

Consider a small review of DART resources in Q4 23/24, if the concerns around RASSO capacity are not reducing.

### Summary of Change

Several teams or functions remain unchanged in the model including:

- Local Intelligence; Force Intelligence Bureau; Dedicated Source Unit; Covert Authorities Bureau; ANPR; Systems Admin and PNSB.

The significant change was the creation of the Intelligence Hub which absorbed the i24 team and provided additional resources. The model created combined officer and staff teams. The policing knowledge and warranted powers of the officers enhances the team, when combined with the bespoke skills of dedicated police staff. Three teams provide 24/7 cover, and the addition of a second Sergeant provides enhanced supervisory capacity to ensure the teams are managed and tasked effectively.

### Review Summary

The changes to Intelligence were overall small, compared with other areas of the model with most Intel teams unaffected.

The Intel Hub was a more significant change. It has only recently reached the establishment in the new model with the second Sergeant landing December 2023 and most other vacancies filled. It is therefore too early to take an evidenced / data-based approach to the review.

The assessment of the Director of Intelligence is that the model is a positive step forward and provides a strong foundation to drive performance. The additional capacity is now enabling staff in the Hub to do development work and research work, which was a challenge due to low capacity previously.

The Intelligence Commissioning Portal went live December 2023 and this will provide an additional data set to understand the volume and performance of the team. The Director of Intelligence is keeping a close watching brief on performance of the Hub as it embeds now it is as per the model.

The Empower People Phase 1 team concluded that (for now), the Systems Admin Team should remain in Intelligence. The Change Team and Digital Services will revisit this decision with a review commencing January 2024. This is driven by a number of factors, including the move to automated/role-based access, the need to more closely align the Joiners / Movers / Leavers process, the move of more systems to cloud hosting, and challenges with other Systems Admin teams (e.g. OCC) that are small and lack resilience. The fundamental question the review will seek to answer, is whether the multiple Systems Admin teams across the organisation should be brought together under a single leadership structure in Digital Services.

### Residual Activity

Systems Admin will be reviewed in January 2024 – with the review led by Change / Digital Services

### Summary of Change

The model created a new department: 'Prevention'. The department thematically aligned a number of functions.

A single offender management function was implemented, situated within Prevention under a shared DCI and a dedicated DI. Operational offender Management teams are:

- RSOMU – Registered Sex Offender Management Unit
- IOM – Integrated Offender Management Unit
- HROMU – High Risk Offender Management Unit (Dangerous and Violent Offenders)
- MAPPA - Multi Agency Public Protection Arrangements

The strong national focus on increasing positive outcomes for sexual offences and increasing demand within Warwickshire has increased the number of registered sex offenders in the county. Recognising this, the model increased the size of the RSMOU (by 2 x DCs) to a team of two Sergeants and 16 Constables with a North and South team and in line with the nationally permitted ratios. It also directly addresses a HMICFRS recommendation in the 2022 Child Protection Investigation, that Warwickshire “acts to improve its management of registered sex offenders.”

Further, there was a disparity between the management of registered sex offenders & the management of registered dangerous or violent offenders, with the latter being the responsibility of the IOM team. Police officer management & support for the IOM team was provided primarily from Proactive CID who had a significant number of other competing demands which can restrict their ability to support offender management. As such, a HROMU was created of one Detective Sergeant and four Detective Constables to address this.

A new Prevention Hub was created with a clear focus on prevention. The consists of several existing roles, in addition to some newly created roles. Roles include:

- Design out Crime
- Prevention Officers
- Community Harm
- Problem Solving
- Licensing
- Youth Engagement
- Civil Interventions

The focus on prevention supports the national direction of travel and underlines Warwickshire's commitment to preventing crimes before it happens. A review of this function is out of scope for this paper, as the Prevention Hub only went live in November 2023. A fuller review should be carried out May 2024.



## Review Summary

The Prevention Hub was launched 20 November 2023. It is therefore too early to review and is out of scope for this report. A full review should take place mid-2024.

As a new function, the work of the Prevention Hub still remains embryonic. This is a vital part of the model, and the force will need to remain vigilant to ensure it does achieve what it was set out to. This is recognised with Supt leadership for the area.

The new Prevention build is still too new to fully understand the impacts; however, positive feedback is being received that we are already seeing greater ownership of SOAC offences and a better focus on suspect/offender management.

Having said that, there is a risk of a gap forming around where locally based level 1 SOC offending should sit, with the formation of the Prevention Hub. The Crime Allocation Review must consider crime and demand allocation between SNT, FCID and Prevention Hub is clear and appropriate.

As a new function, feedback was received that there is some confusion around elements within the Prevention area, such as youth engagement, which have an important delivery arm within Local Policing and other business areas. Ongoing communications and promotion of the roles and responsibilities of the team and how it interfaces with other departments will be important as it embeds.

Similarly clear performance KPIs are required.

## Residual Activity

Ensure the Crime Allocation Model review considers the role of the Prevention Hub to ensure a gap does not form around low level SOC1 offences.

Complete a proportionate review of the Prevention Hub in mid-2024.

## 8. Enabling Services Post Implementation Review

### Learning & Development

#### Summary of Change

During the design phase of the programme, a consistent concern was on the capacity of the L&D team to meet essential training demands such as officer safety training (OST) and investigative skills. Concerns around the size of L&D were raised consistently with the Programme Team, by business leads from both Local Policing and Protective Services.

The areas causing the most concern were:

- Investigative skills; Officer safety training and first aid; Driver training and Management of the new student officer entry routes (PEQF)

The inability to deliver core training in house had (and continue to) led to the external training budget becoming heavily overspent.

The following growth was built into the L&D model:

- Increase the number of Investigative Skills Trainers from one to three (200% increase)
- Increase the number of OST trainers from four to six (50% increase)
- Increase the number of Driver Trainers from three to four (33% increase)

#### Review Summary

Concerns around L&D capacity were identified through this report, but they were also already recognised at an organisational level. A detailed review of L&D was conducted between Q2 and Q3 23/24, with findings now being triaged with Chief Officers. That review supersedes this report. The detailed L&D findings are being considered at the time of writing this report. Having said that, engagement with senior leads in the production of this report identified the following themes, which have been passed onto the L&D Review team.

- CPD opportunities significantly lacking (Protective Services) – much of this is capacity driven.
- Concerned at the lack of PIP1 CPD across the force.
- Emerging skills gap due to levels of experience in investigations - PIU staff are only PIP 1 trained and are picking up more complex investigations, especially during the summer when CID/ MIU were committed with the 2 Cat A murders. Enhanced PIP training should be considered.
- Backlog of mandatory training.
- Driver training capacity / backlog
- Inability to extract and build in training days (capacity / shift pattern driven).
- L&D, even with the changes implemented by Empower People Phase 1, are not adequately resourced to deliver training for new teams.

#### Residual Activity

N/A - Empower People Phase 2 (L&D Review) findings to be taken forward directly with Chief Officers.

## 9. Summary of Actions

Actions / Recommendations	Status / Owner
Consider a review of Duties in 24/25 - to review process, practice and resourcing. For example, expanding scope to Protective Services duties planning	Supt Steve Beard
Consider follow up review / strengthening of CAM application and guidance	Ch Supts LP and PS
Review FIM model to address capacity / resilience concerns	Complete
Missing Team to continue process improvement work for MISPER to improve investigation standards. BA support to be provided as required	Complete
Supt Operations to produce zero cost and costed options to address the issues relating to the changes to shift pattern	Supt Steve Beard - In Progress
Implement agreed movement of Custody from CJ to C&R.	Complete
Note feedback from one of the LPA CIs that PA support would release capacity for them.	BAU
Note minor feedback from LPRC team on ICT equipment issues. This has been provided to DS to assess and respond	BAU
Note broad feedback on the importance of continuing to prioritise CPD (e.g. PIUs) to drive performance	BAU
FCID / PPU supervisory capacity reviewed and addressed via Business Planning	In Progress
Supts for Intel, FCID, Prevention and LP to review CAM to ensure there are no emerging crime allocation gaps for lower level investigations and SOC1	Ch Supts LP and PS
Consider a small review of DART resources in Q4 23/24, if the challenges around RASSO capacity are not reducing	Supt PPU
Systems Admin to be reviewed in Q4 23/24 - with the review led by Change / Digital Services	In Progress
Consider a proportionate review of the Prevention Hub in 2024	Supt Prevention

**END OF REPORT**